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Enforcing the Bargain v. Materiality
Requirement
The Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements
Post-Trulia
By Hao Jiang*
Abstract
In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware
Court of Chancery broke away from its tradition of routinely
approving disclosure-only settlements and required disclosures
to be material in order to cure the conflict of interest between
plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class. I argue that fairness
of settlement is the only standard in approving class action
settlements and fairness will not be achieved by requiring
materiality. Shareholders are legally entitled to all material
information, as the board’s fiduciary duty dictates. Thus,
material disclosures are enforcement of a legal duty that is no
consideration for the release of shareholder claims. On the
other hand, fairness could be achieved by enforcing the bargain
if the bargaining process was conducted fairly and in good
faith. The agency problem and the conflict of interest between
the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class can be resolved by
judicial assessment on whether there was adequate
representation based on the effort of the plaintiff’s counsel and
the appropriate attorney fee award according to the wellestablished three-scale system in quantifying the appropriate
attorney fees. In addition, overbroad releases can be rescinded
under the contract doctrines of fraud and unconscionability if
such settlements were fraudulently induced or the release is
overbroad compared to the benefit that the disclosures conveyed.
* Copyright © 2018 by Hao Jiang. Visiting Assistant Professor, Tulane Law
School. Visiting Fellow at Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. J.D., S.J.D.,Tulane Law
School. I would like to thank Jim Gordley, Onnig Dombalagian, Ann Lipton
and participants of Tulane Law School Faculty Workshop and UCLA
Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop. I am also grateful for the
research support that I received at Max Planck Institute.
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I. Introduction
A settlement agreement is a contract, and its terms are
usually enforced by courts as such. In contract law, normative
doctrines and theories are not concerned about the fairness of
the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in the
marketplace.
Delaware courts, as the de facto national
business lawmaker, have an even stronger desire to respect
freedom of contract and favor the terms in the voluntary
settlement.1
In approving class action settlements in Delaware, just as
in other states, the law is more paternalistic to protect the
weaker party, the plaintiff class. The court has to assume the
fiduciary duty to independently examine the fairness of the
class action settlement before approving it.2 Such an approval
“‘requires more than a cursory scrutiny by the court of the
issues presented.’ The [c]ourt must exercise its own judgment
to determine whether the settlement is reasonable and
intrinsically fair.”3
In determining the fairness of the
settlement, the court also has to evaluate “‘the reasonableness
of the “give” and the “get,”‘ or what the class members receive
in exchange for ending the litigation.”4 Supposedly, when it is
clear that there is gross disparity between the two sides of the
proposed class action settlement, it is the Court’s statutory
duty to disapprove it.
A disclosure-only settlement is a non-monetary form of
settlement where the plaintiffs, a class of stockholders, release
any breach of fiduciary duty claims they may have against a
company in connection to the sale of a company. In return,
they receive supplemental disclosures. Meanwhile, the only
money changing hands would be the plaintiff’s attorney fees,
which are paid by the corporations under the corporate benefit

1. Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Del. 1964) (Explaining Delaware
has long favored the voluntary settlement over litigation).
2. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 58-59 (Del. 1991). See also DEL. CH.
CT. R. 23.
3. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch.
2016). See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.
4. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891.
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Such settlements are often described as “a
doctrine.5
peppercorn and a fee[,]”6 a peppercorn for the plaintiff class
and a sizeable fee for the plaintiff’s counsel. Supposedly, so
long as the settlement is not one sided, the Court has no reason
to disapprove the settlement. The Court’s fiduciary duty is to
ensure the fairness of the bargain in the class action settlement
rather than to police the minimum price.
Therefore, if
information is the only consideration, the release of meritorious
claims deserves meaningful disclosure, or even material
disclosure. The broad release of meritorious claims deserves
material information, or information that has value that equals
the release of the claims. On the other hand, it should not
offend a court that non-meritorious claims were released for
disclosures that have basically no value or only therapeutic
value.
Traditionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery routinely
approved such settlements as they were proposed. In recent
years, virtually all major merger transactions in Delaware
have resulted in shareholder litigation. The percentage of
shareholder litigation arising out of transactions of $100
million or more increased from 39.3% in 2005 to 94.9% in
2014.7
Such litigation would be filed right after the
announcement of a proposed transaction and its existence
would pose a threat to the closing of such transaction. Half of
such transactions result in disclosure-only settlements. Given
the proliferation of litigation, the Chancery Court is now
concerned that approving disclosure-only settlements and
awarding fees as proposed will result in court-approved,
overbroad release of liabilities for the contracting parties,
directors, officers, and advisors for disclosures that did not
convey any benefits to the plaintiff class. This is due to the
agency problem between the plaintiff’s counsels and the
5. When a plaintiff pursues a cause of action relating to the internal
affairs of a Delaware corporation and generates benefits for the corporation
or its stockholders, Delaware law calls for the plaintiff to receive an award of
attorneys’ fees and expenses determined based on the factors set forth in
Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980).
6. This term was coined by former Chancellor Allen. Solomon v. Pathe
Commc’ns Corp., CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21,
1995).
7. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894.
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plaintiff class.
The Chancery Court has grown wary of the divergent or
conflicted incentives plaintiff firms might have in reaching a
disclosure-only settlement. Once they reach a disclosure-only
settlement, they would normally be awarded a six-figure
attorney’s fee. If the market were perfect, and plaintiff firm’s
incentive was compatible with the plaintiff, the court would not
have to worry about the fairness of the settlement as a
contract. If it were a monetary settlement, the Court would
pay less attention to the adequacy of the consideration and
simply give deference to the settlement terms.8 When there is
no monetary award to the shareholders, the Court is troubled
by the plaintiff counsel’s divergent incentive to quickly deliver
a settlement that does not confer any benefits to the plaintiff
class.
In the notable recent case, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder
Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from
the tradition of approving non-monetary disclosure-only
settlements and made it clear that such disclosure settlements
“[will] be met with continued disfavor” unless supplemental
disclosures are “plainly material” and the scope of release is
proportionate to the claims.9 Materiality turns on whether
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider [the disclosure] important in deciding how to
vote.”10 “It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood
that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his vote.”11 But the disclosure of
omitted facts “would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
8. See In re Cox Radio Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP,
2010 WL 1806616, at *1, (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (only a one dollar increase in
the tender offer price resulted from the settlement, but the Court approved
the settlement despite objector’s claim that it was only a modest benefit).
9 In re Trulia,129 A.3d at 898 (“To be more specific, practitioners should
expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly
material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than
disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the
record shows that such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”).
10. Tsc Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
11. Id.
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information made available.”12
The triggering event of this policy change was the patently
inadequate representation the Court found in In re Rural
Metro Corp. Shareholders Litigation. In that case, the board of
directors were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and the
bankers were found to have aided and abetted the breaches in
the sale of corporation.13 The original plaintiff firm sought to
secure a $475,000 attorney fee award by accepting
supplemental disclosure after a low-cost investigation, which
only incurred less than $15,000 in out-of-pocket expenses,
including expert fees.14 Things got turned around when the
objector surfaced and the replacement counsels took over and
investigated the facts vigorously. The new counsels incurred
over $1.1 million in expert expenses and 6953 hours of attorney
time.15 As a result, a partial settlement was reached at $11.6
million.16 An attorney fee award of $2.9 million was awarded
based on the benefit of $11.6 million in “cold hard cash.”17
A lot has been written on how to resolve the agency
problem.18 In In re Trulia, the court adopted the materiality
12. Id. See also Unanue v. Unanue, No. Civ. A. 204-N, 2004 WL
2521292, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004).
13. See generally In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54
(Del. Ch. 2014).
14. Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic
Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 907 (2016)
[hereinafter Rural/Metro].
15. Id. at 908.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 892 (quoting Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 27-28, In re
Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2013 WL 7137206 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19,
2013) (No. 6350-VCL)).
18. See, e.g., Rural/Metro, supra note 14; Sean J. Griffith, Correcting
Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Correcting Corporate Benefit];
Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S.
Thomas eds., forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Private Ordering Post-Trulia],
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950; Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen,
Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits without
Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491
(2016); Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware
Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only
Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669 (2013).
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requirement proposed by one article.19 In Of Babies and
Bathwater, the authors provide a two-part test that aims to
“eliminate the weakest two-thirds of all stockholder
litigation.”20 The first test is that the disclosure must be
material, without which there cannot be consideration to
support a disclosure-only settlement.21 The second part, is that
the Court shall not approve an overbroad release.22 The
release shall instead be limited to the benefit of the disclosures
obtained.23 The first part was adopted by Trulia; the second
part has also been part of the Court’s practice24 and set out to
protect meritorious claims that were not “properly vetted” from
being released.25 This test “would require a demonstration that
the proposed release is directly related to the claims pursued in
the litigation and proportionate to the supplemental
disclosures . . . .”26
After Trulia, practitioners and commentators predicted
that disclosure-based agreements, “if not entirely dead . . . are
on life support with only the faintest hint of a pulse.”27 Sean
Griffith, an academic who has been following the development
of disclosure-only settlements, concluded that the heightened
standard of materiality is now a “condition for the approval of
disclosure settlements” in Delaware.28 Seemingly, the Court
put its foot down and established a new rule in approving
disclosure-only settlements.
Now, it is required that
disclosures be material.
In this article, I would like to examine whether the new
materiality requirement in approving disclosure-only
settlements is doctrinally coherent with contract law doctrines,
19. See generally Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18.
20. Id. at 492.
21. Id. at 491-92, 498.
22. Id. at 492.
23. Id.
24. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing and the Court’s Ruling, In re
Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No.
7857-CS).
25. Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 492.
26. Id. at 538.
27. Eric Waxman, Disclosure-Based Settlements, Not Business as Usual,
WALL STREET LAW., Mar. 2016, at 1.
28. Private Ordering Post-Trulia, supra note 18 at 5.
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operates to resolve the agency problem, and ensures fairness in
class action settlements. I will argue that enforcing the
bargain as agreed to is a better approach, and that the
requirement of materiality would be contradictory to the
doctrine of consideration by giving the board of directors policy
incentives to withhold material information, instead of
disclosing it in the first place. Market competition among
plaintiff firms and judicial assessment of appropriate attorney
fee awards can realign the interest between the plaintiff’s
counsel and the plaintiff class. Lastly, the concern about the
overbroad release of liabilities by approving disclosure-only
settlements can be resolved by challenging the finality of the
settlement. I will discuss how such settlements can be
rescinded by contract law doctrines of fraudulent
misrepresentation and unconscionability. In the end, I will
conclude that enforcing the bargain is a better approach than
the judicial mandate of materiality in approving disclosureonly settlements and should be the future.
II. Doctrinal and Policy Defects in Requiring Materiality
A. Performance of Legal Duty is No Consideration
As we have discussed, the threshold in approving
disclosure-only settlements has become that the supplemental
disclosures must “address a plainly material misrepresentation
or omission.”29 In Of Babies and Bathwater, the influential
article that promoted the heightened standard, the authors
reasoned that, in disclosure-only settlements, “[a] disclosure
that is not material as a matter of law is not consideration as a
matter of fact. Without consideration, there should be no
settlement.”30 However, such an argument would open itself
up to two doctrinal objections.
First of all, as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts put
it, performance of legal duty is no consideration.31 Meanwhile,
29. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch.
2016).
30. Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 498.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
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the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to disclose all
material information fully and fairly even when there is no
initial duty to disclose the information.32 The fiduciary duty is
a statutory duty under Delaware General Corporate Law, and
logically disclosing supplemental information that is material
is only a fulfillment of such duty and will not constitute legally
sufficient consideration.33
The rationale is simple: If the legal duty is already owed to
the promisee, then the promisor did not give up any legal right
by performing such duty. Therefore, the performance was not
bargained for. Such an exchange raises a suspicion as to
whether it is a genuine exchange. As the comments of the
Restatement point out, “[a] claim that the performance of a
legal duty furnished consideration for a promise often raises a
suspicion that the transaction was gratuitous or mistaken or
unconscionable.”34
Material supplemental disclosures as consideration is a
bargain for forbearance to commit a tort, breach of fiduciary
duty. Such forbearance is not consideration and the promise
may be unenforceable as against public policy.35 That is, the
promise of a broad release of managerial liabilities out of the
sale process would be unenforceable when it was supported by
merely material disclosures, which is not legally sound
consideration.
As we discussed, Rule 23 imposes on the Court the
fiduciary duty to examine the fairness of the class action
Fairness is not preserved when material
settlement.36
disclosures are given in exchange for a release because the
plaintiff class is legally entitled to such disclosures. Fairness is
also not preserved when valuable, but non-material
disclosures, that the defendant did not have pre-existing legal
duty to provide, were given in exchange for weak claims that
had no value.
32. Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del.
Ch. 1987).
Moreover, duties of fiduciaries are within the scope of
Restatement § 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. b.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (1991).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a.
35. Id. § 73 cmt. b.
36. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.
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On the other hand, consideration need not be adequate.37
Any performance which is bargained for is consideration.38
This rule does not require that “consideration have an
economic value equivalent to that of the promise.”39 It does not
matter whether supplemental disclosures are meaningful, only
of marginal and therapeutic value, or are simply helpful, any
value conveyed through disclosures would be legally sufficient
to constitute consideration. However, this does not mean
fairness will not be achieved without having an adequacy
requirement in the doctrine of consideration. As we will
discuss in Part III, market competition will ensure fairness of
the bargain and all that the Court has to do is to enforce the
bargain.
B. Materiality Requirement as an Incentive to Withhold
Information for the Sake of Settlements
On the policy front, requiring materiality in supplemental
disclosure is not sound either. Normally, enforcement of a halfcompleted bargain is beneficial to the society. It allows
freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment that
increases productivity and efficient allocation of resources in
the economy.40
Supposedly, a court shall enforce the broad release when
the material disclosures were given in exchange for that
release. However, since disclosing material information was
only performance of a pre-existing legal duty, such a bargain
shall not be enforced as a matter of public policy. Enforcing a
pre-existing legal duty gives rise to the strong possibility that
“the promise was obtained by an express or implied threat to
withhold performance of a legal duty, the promise does not
have the presumptive social utility normally found in a
Thus, since all major transactions attract
bargain.”41
shareholder litigation and half of these cases are settled by
disclosure-only settlements, the board of directors would
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79.
Id.
Id. § 72 cmt. d.
Id. § 72 cmt. b.
Id. § 73 cmt. a.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8

10

JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/9/18 12:31 AM

DISCLOSURE-ONLY SETTLEMENTS

579

benefit from hiding material information in the first place in
anticipation of shareholder claims. Enforcing the materiality
requirement would only encourage the board to withhold
disclosures that would be deemed material so that they can
disclose such information to settle the highly-anticipated
shareholder claims that would otherwise not be settled without
a monetary compensation.
C. To Encourage or to Deter? What is the Public Policy?
Normally, freedom of contract is respected in all Western
jurisdictions.42 Freedom of contract has long been the leading
public policy in Delaware and courts are supposed to enforce
the plain terms of a contract freely entered by parties.43 Still,
each system “must reserve the right to declare a contract void
if it is illegally or morally offensive . . . or ‘contrary to public
policy.’”44
Since there are no concerns towards the legality of such
settlements, the only normative objection over a freely-entered
settlement would be the public policy ground. As such, is there
a public policy reason to deny all the disclosure-only
settlements?
In approving disclosure-only settlements, the Chancery
Court has two conflicting public policy goals in mind. The first
is to lower the “deal tax.” This means the court would have the

42. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 380 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed., 1998).
43. See, e.g., Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., No. 1416-N, 2006 WL
4782348, at *7 n.17 (Del. Ch. Jun. 5, 2006) (“It is imperative that contracting
parties know that a court will enforce a contract’s clear terms and will not
judicially alter their bargain, so courts do not trump the freedom of contract
lightly.”); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1152
(Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]his court’s duty is to respect the contract freely entered
into by all the members . . . .”); Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre
Co., 843 A.2d 697, 712 (Del. Ch. 2004) (ruling that enforcing the “plain terms”
of a contract furthers Delaware law’s goal of promoting reliable and efficient
corporate and commercial laws); see also Marino v. Grupo Mundial Tenedora,
S.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The policy of the Delaware
Act is ‘to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.’”) (citation
omitted).
44. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 42, at 380.
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incentive to make a plaintiff’s non-meritorious claims go away
as cheaply as possible by approving disclosure settlements and
mooting the claims. The second is to reject such settlements
when it is not convincing that the plaintiff class received
adequate representation and reasonableness or equivalence
between “give” and “get” is preserved.
The Court is
conscientious about preventing corporate defendants from
being released from future claims without having them
vigorously vetted by the plaintiff’s counsel.
The first policy concern led to the routine approval of
disclosure settlements before Rural Metro Corp., while the
second concern led the Court to the materiality requirement set
forth in Trulia.45 Both efforts were made to fulfill the Rule 23
duty to ensure the reasonableness and substantive fairness of
the two sides of the settlement.46
Major mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals attract
litigation, and most of them are weak claims that could not
have succeeded in litigation. The benefit of disclosure-only
settlements is that when the plaintiff class receives additional
information through the help of the plaintiff’s attorneys and
recognizes that their initial claims were weak or groundless,
the board of directors are released from liabilities relating to
the transaction once and for all.
It also increases the
47
transparency of deal making.
In light of this, the public policy would be to encourage
quick settlement, especially non-monetary settlement, and the
Chancery Court shall deem such settlements as beneficial.
Therefore, when the defendants offer to settle the case by
giving out supplemental information and a relatively small but
substantial attorney fee for the plaintiff’s lawyers, the court
would assume that negotiations have been conducted at arm’s
length and in good faith.48 Therefore, the public policy of the
45. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch.
2016); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch.
2014).
46. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.
47. As a result, companies are willing to provide disclosures “that would
have never been in a proxy statement 20 years ago” and such disclosures
have, in Strine’s words “gotten increasingly more informative.” Sumpter,
supra note 18, at 687.
48. See In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 298 F.R.D. 171,
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court would be to promote deal efficiency by approving such
settlements regardless of the materiality of the supplemental
information.
On the other hand, the Chancery Court has to face the
challenge of evaluating such settlements through a nonadversarial process.49 The Delaware Chancery Court has a
legitimate concern that routine approval of all disclosure-based
settlements would result in the loss of valuable claims through
the broad release.
The defendants would have the incentive to pay a
relatively small fee to obtain a broad release50 as deal
insurance. Such an incentive is compatible with the plaintiff’s
counsel’s incentive to obtain a quick attorney fee award by
agreeing to the disclosure-only settlement. Such broad release,
which often includes all possible claims related to the events,51
along with “claims that could not have been litigated in the
settled action, such as federal securities claims,”52 is being seen
as disproportionate to the benefit of the disclosures obtained.
Chancellor Bouchard blamed the Court of Chancery’s
willingness to give blind approval of such settlements as the
cause of the explosion of deal litigation.53 Would blind denial
unless disclosure is material work the magic then?
Denial of all disclosure-only settlements would make the
shareholder claims more expensive to settle, and would not
necessarily preserve fairness.54 Plaintiffs might flee Delaware,
179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
49. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887.
50. Peter J. Walsh Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Delaware Insider: Trulia and
the Demise of “Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb.
2016, at 1.
51. See Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 385
(Del. Ch. 2010).
52. Id.
53. See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894 (“It is beyond doubt in my view
that the dynamics described above, in particular the Court’s willingness in
the past to approve disclosure settlements of marginal value and to routinely
grant broad releases to defendants and six-figure fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in
the process, have caused deal litigation to explode in the United States
beyond the realm of reason.”).
54. Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring one
side of the equation to have value without knowing whether the other side
has any value. Fairness is therefore not preserved when valuable disclosures
that would otherwise not have been legally required to be disclosed is given
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or the claims might be re-litigated after the denial, or
defendants would have to provide a small monetary settlement
($1 increase per share) as we have seen in Cox Radio.55 In the
later scenario, stockholders might still be undercompensated.
The only legitimate public policy remains that the
Chancery Court shall ensure the fairness of the settlement.
Approval of settlement agreement has depended and will
continue to depend on whether the court has been convinced
that the two sides of the contract are equivalent.
Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring
one side of the equation to have value without knowing
whether the other side has any value.
III. Market Mechanisms and Judicial Assessment
A. Enforcing the Bargain: Achieving Fairness Through
Market
As it has been discussed, fairness remains the only criteria
in approving disclosure-only settlement. The core argument of
this article is that fairness of disclosure-only settlement is
achieved by enforcing the bargain as it is. In contract law,
normative doctrines and theories do not concern about the
fairness of the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in
the market place. Fairness does not seem to matter in contract
law but fairness is otherwise preserved through the use of the
doctrine of unconscionability. The idea is that when the
market is competitive, market information would freely flow
and everyone would have access to the market price. As a
result, when negotiation was at arm’s length, the settlement
would normally be reached at market price as no one would be
willing to give more or receive less when they have access to
market price. If it was found out later that the settlement was
induced by misrepresentation or omission of material facts, the
settlement could be rescinded based on the doctrine of fraud or

in exchange of meritless claims.
55. See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP,
2010 WL 1806616 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), at *1.
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misrepresentation.56 If the two sides of the settlement were
overall imbalanced, the performance of the settlement can be
denied. If settlement terms are deemed unconscionable, the
settlement can be set aside. A combination of procedural and
substantive unconscionability can result in rescission of the
agreement even after a settlement is reached between two
parties and approved by the court.57 In addition to that, gross
disparity alone will be enough to result in a denial of specific
performance.58
1. Fairness Matters in Contract Law
Formally, as Stephen Smith describes, fairness does not
play in a role in contract law theory.59 He went further to
argue that substantive fairness has to be excluded from a
ground under the heading of unconscionability.60 The majority
view is that just price does not have a doctrinal place in
contract law theory, and fairness is considered irrelevant in
contract law.61 Once a defender of substantive fairness,62
Stephen Smith observed that support for substantive fairness
is not part of discourse of contract law, nor is it defended by
many contract law scholars.63 It has been said that the idea of
“fair price” is meaningless in a modern economy and
inconsistent with the idea of freedom of contract.64 However,
even Smith had to admit that the lack of fairness would create
problems: it will result in more unjust redistribution;65 it will
reduce contracting;66 it will harm people’s abilities to plan an
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. Law. Inst.
1981).
57. See id. § 71.
58. Id.
59. Stephen A. Smith, In Defence of Substantive Fairness, 112 LAW Q.
REV. 138, 138-39 (1996) [hereinafter Substantive Fairness].
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 191 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698 (1981).
62. See generally Substantive Fairness, supra note 59.
63. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 357 (2004).
64. Id. at 354.
65. Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 146-48.
66. Id. at 148-49.
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autonomous life.67
According to Smith, substantively unfair bargains will
make the already unjust distribution even more unjust because
losers in unfair bargains are usually the less well-off of the two
Also, non-competitive pricing in a
contracting parties.68
competitive market will reduce contracting.69 On the other
hand, an imposition of normal prices will benefit even those
who are unsure of normal prices.70 Contracting at abnormal
prices also harms people’s ability to lead an autonomous life as
our ability to plan the life is built upon the preservation of our
purchasing power and abnormal prices would upset plans and
one’s ability to control and direct their lives.71
As Zweigert and Kötz observed: commutative justice has
always been seen to require a certain equivalence between
performance and counter-performance.72 The gross disparity
between the performance and counter-performance will open a
contract up for rescission in virtually all major jurisdictions.73
Normally, contract law does not require equality in
exchange, but gross disparity between the two sides of the
contract would allow courts to avoid the contract terms as
unconscionable.
As Corbin describes, “adequacy of
67. Id. at 151-56.
68. Id. at 147-48.
69. Id. at 148-49.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 150-52.
72. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 42, at 328.
73. Nominal consideration is not supported by either American or
English law. See Restatement of Contracts (Second)–A Rejection of Nominal
Consideration?, 1 VAL. U.L. REV. 102 (1966); P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 126-29 (1995). American courts often apply
unconscionability to correct unfair contracts. French law traditionally
requires a counter-performance to reflect consideration of the real interest
and be genuine and reasonable in order to maintain the cause of the
contract. See Judith Rochfeld, A Future for la cause? Observations of a French
Jurist, in REFORMING THE FRENCH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, 73, 81 (John
Carwright, Stefan Vogenauer, & Simon Whittaker eds. 2009); After the
abolition of cause in 2016 in French civil law reforms, the new article 1143
established a new doctrine of violence économique that serves the same
function. In German law, gross disparity (grobes Missverhältnis) can also
render a contract void for violation of good morals (gute Sitten). See BGB
§ 138 and Bundesgerichtshof, 9 November 1961, BB, 1962, 156 (the court
held that an interest rate of 45% should be held invalid as contrary to good
morals).
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consideration is not required to be adequate in the sense of
equality in value.”74 Corbin also observed that judges, by
acting also as chancellors, will avoid enforcement of an
unconscionable bargain when the consideration is grossly
inadequate.75 He supplied two reasons: one reason is that the
gross inadequacy may be evidence of fraud, mistake, or undue
influence;76 the other reason is that the relevant factors
accompanying the inadequacy would fit into the concepts of
fraud, duress, misrepresentation and undue influence.77
The Second Restatement of Contracts, in its comment,
insists that usually overall imbalance involves factors other
than mere overall imbalance to qualify the contract as
unconscionable.78 However, it also admits that “gross disparity
in the values exchanged . . . may be sufficient ground, without
more, for denying specific performance.”79 The Restatement
gives courts broad discretion to avoid contract terms that would
have unconscionable results.80
2. Gross Disparity in Exchange as Unconscionable
Scholars might not agree on whether the value of the
objects exchanged through contracts is subjective or objective,
or whether there is a just price. However, it is the consensus
that so long as the market functions, the Court shall enforce
the bargain as they are. Fairness would be achieved by
enforcing the bargains.
When the market malfunctions,
exploitation will likely occur when parties no longer have
access to the market price.
When this happens,
74. ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 188 (1952).
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 185.
77. Id. at 188.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
79. Id. See also Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir.1907)
(inadequacy of consideration sufficient ground for withholding specific
performance if it is so gross as to render the contract unconscionable);
Frank’s Maintenance & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 42
Ill. Dec. 25, 31–32, 408 N.E.2d 403, 409–10 (1980) (“Unconscionability can be
either procedural or substantive or a combination of both.”).
80. Id. § 208.
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unconscionability denies a severely unequal bargain.
The Bargain Principle
Melvin Eisenberg, a doctrinal scholar without any
philosophical or ideological subscriptions, explains why the
bargain principle of contract law—a theory taken literally from
the black letter law—is a sound theory that serves both ends of
contract law, efficiency and fairness, without a normative
regard for fairness.81
The bargain principle can be summarized as simply as
“‘courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration’ or
‘mere inadequacy of consideration will not void a contract.’”82
Eisenberg converts it to a formulation that states that
“damages for unexcused breach of a bargain promise should
invariably be measured by the value the promised performance
would have had to the plaintiff, rather than, and regardless of,
the cost or value of the performance for which the defendant’s
promise was exchanged.”83 In other words, “a bargain promise
should be enforced to its full extent.”84 Normally, in a perfect
market,85 fairness of the terms can never be reviewed by the
court because the price reached through a bargained promise
would be economically efficient and fair. Arguments for
efficient price could be found in that the value is subjective,
credit transactions would only be encouraged if the expectation
that bargain promise would be kept is preserved, contract price
81. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982).
82. See id. at 745. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
83. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745.
84. Id.
85. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 746 (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 196-97 (3d ed. 1979) (A perfectly
competitive market is defined as “a homogeneous commodity (which may
consist of either goods or services); a marketplace at which perfect cost-free
information concerning price is readily available (hereinafter referred to as a
homogeneous marketplace); productive resources that are sufficiently mobile
that pricing decisions readily influence their allocation; and participants
whose market share is so small that none can affect the commodity’s price, so
that each takes the market price as given by outside forces.”)).
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is the most efficient price that best allocates the factors
necessary for the commodity’s production.86 Such a price would
also be the fair price, as, in a perfectly competitive market,
contract price normally equals the benefits conferred,
everybody would use the market price when it is available, and
any lower-than fair price would be eliminated by market
completion.87
However, review of objective fairness of contracts would be
appropriate when perfectly competitive markets are not
As Eisenberg observed, the principle of
available.88
unconscionability permits enforcement of a promise to be
limited on the basis of unfair price alone.89 Unconscionability,
as described in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, only
addresses gross disparity.90
If Eisenberg is right, fairness is protected by contract law
and would be achieved through settlement agreement so long
as it resulted from a free bargain between the plaintiff class
and the defendant corporation and the market was competitive.
If Eisenberg is right, the plaintiff class and the plaintiff’s
counsel who have meritless claims would settle for valueless
supplemental disclosures, and the plaintiff class who have
greater chances of proving defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty
would not settle unless they receive a monetary settlement that
equals the value of their claims, multiplying the likelihood of
the success in trial minus the litigation cost.91 In this view,
courts shall not review the fairness of the settlement terms, but
rather the bargaining process, such as adequacy of
representation or bargaining in good faith. The Chancery
Court can justifiably refuse to approve disclosure-only

86. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745-46.
87. Id. at 747.
88. Id. at 748-54.
89. Id. at 753.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
91. For those who do not think that the claims would be adequately
investigated, the Chancery Court has been looking into the efforts of plaintiff
counsel to determine appropriate attorney fee awards and would not approve
settlements or fee awards if they did not think the case was vigorously
vetted. See, e.g., In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
6574–CS, 2013 WL 1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013).
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settlements when they are not convinced that sufficient vetting
had taken place.
Fairness in Exchange
Among contract theorists, James Gordley, of Aristotelian
tradition, and Peter Benson, of Kantian tradition, are the two
leading advocates in recognizing the importance of fairness of
price in contract law. Still, they both agree that only gross
disparity in consideration shall be remedied by law. But they
differ as to whether equality in exchange shall be the standard
rule, or if it is only the baseline. Gordley argues that all
deviations from just price are entitled to relief to preserve the
purchasing power of the parties and the pre-existing
distribution of wealth.92 While Benson thinks that equivalence
in exchange preserves the wills of the parties, he agrees that
only gross disparity calls for correction.93
The two disagree on whether there is a just price for each
contract and whether a just price can be reached or only
approached. Still, both would agree that a gross deviation from
the market price would call for remedy in contract law, but for
different reasons. To Gordley, only gross disparity is worth
pursuing for practical and evidentiary reasons. To Benson,
gross disparity is evidence for vice of consent and calls for
explanation.
When Value is Objective and there is a Just Price
Gordley, writing from Aristotelian tradition, thinks that
just price is the market price under competitive conditions.94
Just price “varies from day to day and from region to region.”95
Such a price reflects need, scarcity, and cost.96 According to
Aristotle, every contract of exchange is an act of “voluntary
92. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587
(1981).
93. See BENSON, supra note 61, at 191.
94. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 361 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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commutative justice.”97 Therefore, a party shall not be made
poorer or richer over contracting, but may become poorer or
richer in the future.98 There is no reason to charge a higher
price or buy at a lower price if one is really making an
exchange and has access to the market price. In making an
exchange, no reasonable person intends to enrich the other
party at their own expenses. However, one can become richer
by buying low and selling high. One can become poorer by
doing the opposite. Since the market price changes constantly,
all one needs to do is to sell the same object he bought at a
different location where the market price is higher, or on a
different day when the market price is higher. Thus, the
change of wealth happens through a series of contract
transactions rather than one.
In each one of these
transactions, the pre-existing wealth and allocation of
resources between the parties are to be preserved.
However, though just price is approachable and equality in
exchange can be realized, not every disparity will be remedied.
From the Roman rule of laesio enormis to the French doctrine
of lesion,99 for practical reasons, only gross disparity can be
remedied. Such reasons might be that: courts are not in the
best position to determine what the just price was when the
contract was entered; price that seemed unfair after
contracting might be fair upon conclusion – a fair bet at price
fluctuation is fair; and it might not be economical to remedy
every unfair price.100
To Gordley, the object of contract has an objective value
that equals the fair market price, parties are willing to contract
to exchange only because they themselves place a higher
subjective value on the things they exchanged. According to
97. Id. at 292.
98. Id. at 363.
99. In Roman law, a contract could be rescinded when a thing was sold
for less than half of the just price. A buyer can choose to either pay the
difference between the just price and the price paid or rescind the
transaction. See James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies and in
Western History, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2-41
(J.C.B. Mohr, ed. 1997). French law gives relief to the unfair contract when
the sale of land is for less than five-twelfths of the market value. CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1674 (Fr.).
100. Gordley, supra note 92, at 1652-54.
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Gordley’s account, the price reached in a competitive market is
the just price, and so long as parties negotiated at arm’s length,
courts shall enforce the terms unless the price was severely
wrong. The end result is that a range of normal considerations
would be acceptable and only extremely unfair settlements
would be subject to relief.
When Value is Subjective and there is No Just Price
Benson sees contract as a transfer of ownership and the
contemporary common law contract theory as a coherent
unity.101 Consideration requires two sides of the contract to be
qualitatively different, and unconscionability completes the
theory by requiring two sides to be identical in value.102
In Benson’s view, contract law does not require equality in
exchange, but requires equivalence in exchange, which will
preserve equality in value though value is entirely subjective.
By Benson’s account, parties are presumed to have the
intention to transact for equal value,103 at least not the grossly
lacking of equivalence.104 In his view, no one is legally obliged
to transact for equal value.105 A party can waive the receipt of
equal value through assumption of risk or by a donative
intent.106 In these two circumstances, gross inequality cannot
be remedied if the inequality has objectively been willed by the
party.107
However, a contract must honor each party’s capacity to
receive equal value. In the absence of donative intent and
assumption of risk, gross lack of equivalence in an exchange is
voidable.108 Unconscionability supplements contractual liberty
allowed by consideration with contractual fairness.109

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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See id.
See id. at 184.
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Different from Gordley’s account, Benson thinks all the
normal prices are competitive prices and values are subjective
to the parties. Benson argues that “[a] competitive market
price is an ideal notion which obtains at long-term equilibrium.
It is only approached, and never fully realized, by actually
existing market systems, even on the supposition that these
are competitive.”110 As a result, there will be a range of
competitive
prices
and
they
are
all
enforceable.
Unconscionability only deals with a gross lack of equivalence.
Contracts can be avoided when the price falls out of the
baseline and parties’ intention to transact at equal value can
no longer be construed in light of the gross lack of equivalence.
Benson’s account of contractual fairness is what I call
subjective fairness. However, even this subjective account has
objective criterion, which is the gross lack of equivalence. By
Benson’s account, in Trulia, the plaintiff class is presumed to
intend to transact for equal value in reaching the settlement.
Consideration only requires the two sides to be distinctively
different. Once they are, they can possibly be construed as
equivalent unless there was gross lack of equivalence as
measured by market prices. Such gross lack of equivalence is
seen as evidence for violation of parties’ intention. So, we can
infer that happens when an overbroad release was obtained in
exchange for disclosure of therapeutic value, in Benson’s
theory, gross lack of equivalence will warrant the avoidance of
the settlement, even if the two sides are distinctively different.
B. The Plaintiff Firm Market
The incentive divergence between the plaintiff’s counsel
and the plaintiff class had led to the non-adversarial nature of
the settlement agreement negotiation according to the court.111
This incentive divergence further led to the systemic problem
and market failure that eventually led to the overcompensation of the plaintiff’s counsel and under-compensation
of the plaintiff class. The main complaint is that the corporate

110. See id. at 190.
111. See, e.g., In re Trulia Inc., Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893
(Del. Ch. 2016).
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defendant will willingly pay the plaintiff’s attorneys for broad
releases. Many plaintiff firms make it a business model to
obtain such an award as early as possible by reaching the
disclosure settlement as cheaply and quickly as possible.112
Several articles have been written to propose cures for the
problem.113 Such proposals include the influential one that
requires materiality in approving disclosure-only settlement,114
adjusting attorney’s fee award according to the benefits
conferred to the plaintiff class,115 and shifting the attorney’s fee
to the plaintiff class.116 However, the current practice does
embody functional market mechanisms that will make the
incentives of the plaintiff firms and the plaintiff class
compatible.
When there is a meritorious case, the market will give
plaintiff firms higher incentives to commit more resources in
proving their theory and achieving a more beneficial
settlement. After all, incentives between the plaintiff’s counsel
and the plaintiff class can be realigned when filing meritorious
claims and achieving significant benefits for the shareholders
can result in seven-figure attorney’s fees, as it so happened in
Rural Metro Corp.,117 and filing weak claims, obtaining low
value disclosures that moot claims that would lead to a fivefigure award as in Sauer-Danfoss.118
The Court does not have the capacity to go provide the
appropriate due diligence on the merits of the claims, but that
should not concern most litigants, commentators, or
practitioners.
Since virtually all major mergers and
acquisitions transactions attract litigation, the Court can often
tell that there is little chance for the plaintiff class to obtain
any monetary settlement in the first place. Approving a class
action settlement that exchanges non-meritorious claims for a
112. See Friedlander, supra note 14.
113. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 14; Griffith, supra note 18;
Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18; Sumpter, supra note 18.
114. See Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18.
115. See Sumpter, supra note 18.
116. See Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 18.
117. See Friedlander, supra note 14.
118. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch.
2011) (the court lowered the $750,000 award requested by the plaintiff’s
attorney for attorney’s fees to $75,000 based on the merits of the work done).
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broad release meets the fairness standard in Rule 23 of
Delaware Court of Chancery Rules. On the other hand, the
materiality requirement, regardless of the merits of the claims
and availability of material information, will incentivize
extortion and harassment toward the deep pockets. Also, the
law firms that have built a business model for only delivering
non-monetary settlements with the sole purpose of obtaining a
six-figure attorney fee will not be sustainable in the market
place. Such shops who rely on soliciting small investors and
being selected by the Court as lead counsel in class action
litigation will not likely succeed in landing representations
when they have developed a reputation for only being able to
deliver non-monetary settlements.
Based on a recent empirical study on the effectiveness of
plaintiff law firms in mergers and acquisitions litigation and
shareholder claims, the presence of identified top law firms is
“significantly and positively associated with a higher
probability of lawsuit success.”119 These top law firms are the
entrepreneurial firms that vet the claims properly and devote
substantial human and financial resources necessary to
uncover a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. With such
transparent market information, the firms that have developed
the reputation of suing on every deal with “hastily drafted
complaints”120 will not likely be selected by the Chancery Court
who select firms based on reputation and merits. Once
selected, their proposed settlement would undergo more critical
and severe scrutiny by the court before the approval of the
settlement.
Consequently, shareholders with meritorious claims would
be after the first-tier firms, and first-tier firms would have the

119. See generally C.N.V. Krishanan, Steven D. Solomon, & Randall S.
Thomas, Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law
Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. ECON. R. 88 (2016).
120. Many complaints were filed upon the announcement of a
transaction without committing the time and resources necessary to vet the
claims. An extreme example can be found in In re Cox Communications. A
proposal to acquire all of the public shares of Cox was announced at 4:06 am
on August 2, 2004. By 8:36 am of that same day, the first of “a flurry of
hastily drafted complaints” was filed with the Court. See Sumpter, supra
note 18, at 680 (quoting In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d
604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
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luxury to choose from quality claims. The second-tier firms
would have to settle for weak claims and it will make it even
harder for them to prove their theories effectively and
convincingly. Moreover, the plaintiffs would also be more
likely to pursue and succeed in malpractice claims against
these second-tier firms who might have cost the shareholders
valuable claims. Since the plaintiff firm’s markets favor
merits, it would be much harder for the weaker firms with
weaker claims to survive in the marketplace in the long run.
Moreover, the Court has the discretionary power to deny
approval of the settlement when it is clear that there is gross
disparity between the two sides of the settlement, which is a
more effective tool to ensure fairness than requiring one side of
the exchange to have value without knowing whether the other
side has value. As it has been suggested by the Court, there
are two things that the Court can do to prevent the imbalance
between give and get. The Court sets the attorney’s fee award
corresponding to the benefit conveyed to the plaintiff class.
The idea is that when the fee award is low enough to become
non-profitable and all the counsel could deliver is a disclosure
that has marginal and therapeutic value to the class, it would
discourage plaintiff firms from taking on cases that are
frivolous or invest more in proving the theory. The second tool
is to refuse the proposed settlement when the release is too
broad and conveys significant value compared to the marginal
value of the information the plaintiff class received.
The materiality requirement proposal accepted by the
court aims to disincentivize the plaintiff firms from suing on
every case and force them to screen out frivolous claims.121
However, a heightened standard for approval could make it
more difficult for non-meritorious claims to go away, and go
away cheaply.
As we have discussed, the first tier of top firms has the
resources to investigate and screen out meritless claims, while
the second-tier firms do not have the financial or human
resources to do the same. Logically, they will either flee
Delaware and sue in other jurisdictions or turn away most
cases and deny plaintiffs access to litigation. Moreover, not
121. See Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18.
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approving meager disclosures would be a denial of “deal
insurance” or a punishment to the defendant, and denial of
settlement leaves matters unresolved even if the court thought
the claims were so weak that the plaintiff should abandon the
case with prejudice.122 The reality is that the defendants will
provide modest monetary settlements in addition to the
disclosures, as we have seen in In re Cox Radio Inc.
Even though the monetary
Shareholders Litigation.123
settlement of $1 increase per share only provided modest
benefit,124 the Court will not second guess the monetary
consideration and have to approve the settlement with broad
release.125 As a result, this practice might still result in undercompensation of the stockholders, which makes it more
expensive to dispose of weak claims.
Imposition of materiality assumes there was no good faith
in bargaining because of the divergent incentive of the
plaintiff’s counsel, all the shareholder claims are meritorious,
and there was breach of fiduciary duty by failing to provide
adequate material information in the preliminary proxy
statement by the board.126 Apparently, these premises are not
always satisfied and the court is not in a good position to
measure the value of the benefits that supplemental
information conveys to the putative class, unless there is
obvious gross disparity. The imposed materiality requirement
assumes gross disparity exists in all disclosure-only
settlements, which is likely not the case. On the other hand,

122. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp.
S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (No. 7857-CS) (“I
understand, particularly from the defendants’ side, the reality that what I’ve
done probably, you know, in some ways has a punishing effect, because I
don’t know what else is out there that this leaves unresolved.”); In re
Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013
WL1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (“If the plaintiffs believe their claims are
as weak as their brief presents, then they’re obviously welcome to dismiss
their claims with prejudice as to themselves and to move on if they don’t wish
to prosecute.”).
123. See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010
WL 1806616, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *23.
126. See id. See also Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d
567 (App. Div. 2017).
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enforcement of such a requirement creates an ethical dilemma
that disclosing all material information would not entitle the
company to the benefit of a disclosure-only settlement while
withholding material information, a breach of fiduciary duty,
makes it easy to settle shareholder claims.
C. Judicial Assessment of Merits and Attorney Fees
For the market mechanisms to function, the conflicted
incentives of the plaintiff’s counsel have to be compatible with
those of the plaintiff class. It is essential that the level of
attorney’s fees corresponds to the merits of the disclosures
obtained through the work of attorneys. In applying its
discretion and judicial assessment,127 the Chancery Court has
adopted meticulous standards in measuring both the benefits
of the disclosures and the level of attorney fees that should be
awarded. Sugarland factors provide the guidance for the
Chancery Court to determine an appropriate award. Such
factors include:
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the
case by counsel for the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative
complexities of the litigation; (iii) the standing
and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the
contingent nature of the litigation; (v) the stage
at which the litigation ended; (vi) whether the
plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the
benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and
(vii) the size of the benefit conferred.128

127. ‘‘[T]he amount of an attorneys’ fee award is within the discretion of
the court.’’ In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 071-N, 2005 WL
332811, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2005).
128. Id., at *3 (listing the factors laid out in Sugarland Indus., Inc. v.
Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980)).
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1. Three-Scale Fee Awards
The Sugarland factors do not provide an effective tool for
the Chancery Court to quantify an appropriate award given the
fact that disclosure is “an intangible, non-quantifiable
benefit.”129 Nevertheless, the Court has developed a three-scale
system in Sauer-Danfoss that measures the benefits conveyed
by the disclosures and places each case on a scale based on the
quality of the disclosures and looks to “fee awards granted for
similar disclosures.”130 This fee evaluating system works to
realign the incentives between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’
counsel without a materiality requirement.
Traditionally, most awards are in the range of $400,000 to
$500,000. Chancellor Laster uses this range as the baseline
award for “one or two meaningful disclosures.”131 Meaningful
disclosures can be “previously withheld projections or
undisclosed conflicts faced by fiduciaries or their advisors.”132
The award can be downgraded to the lower scale for disclosures
of “questionable quality.”133 And higher awards are available
for “particularly significant or exceptional disclosures.”134
At the default level, Chancellor Laster found cases with
awards ranging from $300,000 to $525,000. In this range, as
Philip Sumpter observed, a few conditions have to be met: “(1)
plaintiffs obtain a single meaningful disclosure, or (2) plaintiffs
obtain lesser disclosures, but do ‘real work’ in litigating the
case.”135
To qualify for the default level of award, all the plaintiff’s
counsel must do is to obtain “one meaningful quanta of
information.”136 A company’s financial projection and banker’s
analysis are regarded as meaningful.137
However, such
129. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del.
Ch. 2011).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1137.
135. Sumpter, supra note 18, at 708.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 708-10 (discussing In re Zenith, where the Court awarded
$400,000 and “described the disclosure of management projections that were
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disclosures are no longer sufficient to pass the Trulia court’s
material standard.138
Counsel’s expended effort is more important to the Court
than the time spent because it shows proof of adequate
representation of a plaintiff’s interest.139 The effort might be
measured by the number of depositions undertaken,140 whether
those depositions were offensive141 or only confirmatory,142
whether the case was settled before or after the injunction
hearing,143 whether full briefing and argument on application
for preliminary injunction was prepared,144 and whether a
preliminary injunction was granted,145 among other factors.
The award would be downgraded to the lower-than$300,000-range when the disclosures only convey meager
benefits146 and the claims themselves are so weak that it

used by the company’s banker in connection with its fairness opinion as a
meaningful, or ‘major’ disclosure,” and Turberg v. Arcsight, where “the Court
awarded $500,000 in attorneys’ fees because the plaintiffs obtained
previously-undisclosed banker’s analysis.”); see In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 329
F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2003); Turberg v. Arcsight, Inc., C.A. No. 5821-VCL, 2011
WL 4445653 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2011).
138. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. 2016)
(holding synergy figures regarding financial advisor’s value-creation analysis
and information regarding individual company multiples used in financial
advisor’s selected transaction analysis were not material and thus did not
provide adequate consideration for settlement.).
139. See Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1139 (“When an entrepreneurial
plaintiffs’ firm engages in adversarial discovery, obtains documents from
third parties, pursues motions to compel, and litigates merits-oriented
issues”). See also Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement “Problem”:
The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 258
(2007).
140. See generally In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch.
2008).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Augenbaum v. Forman, No. C.A. 1569-N, 2006 WL
1716916 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2006).
143. See, e.g., Globis Capital Partners, LP v. SafeNet, Inc., C.A. No.
2772-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 213, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2007) (settled
after injunction hearing and a $1,200,000 fee was awarded). See also
Augenbaum, 2006 WL 1716916, at *2 (the case was settled without an
injunction hearing, as a result, the fee was only $225,000).
144. See generally In re Lear Corp., 926 A.2d. at 94.
145. Id.
146. Sumpter, supra note 18 at 715.
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should not have been brought in the first place.147 It can also
arise from the fact that the counsel “claimed excessive
hours,”148 the majority of which “derived no benefits.”149 Also,
settling too early without achieving a solid benefit is another
cause for a downgrade.150 Lastly, an award over $500,000
requires significant and exceptional disclosures. This happens
when the plaintiff’s counsel took a risk151 and hit a “home
run.”152
In such cases, the plaintiff’s counsel might have taken ten
offensive depositions, two defensive depositions, and secured a
preliminary injunction.153 They received such disclosures as
information about CEO’s conflict of interest and CEO’s role in
negotiation and the sale process,154 or they had prepared a full
brief, delivered an argument at injunction hearing, and settled
They also received
only after an injunction hearing.155
extensive detailed descriptions of banker’s fairness opinions
and underlying analyses, two complete bankers’ books, and
more than 100 pages of disclosure.156 In these two cases, the
fees were set, respectively, at $800,000 and $1,200,000.157
As we have seen, meticulous and articulate standards in
awarding attorney’s fees have been established. Minimal
benefits will qualify for minimal fees and meaningful
disclosures will justify a hefty fee. Such guidelines shall be
sufficient to measure the work of the plaintiff’s counsel and
make sure their incentives and interests align with the
147. Id. at 719.
148. Id. at 720.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 721.
151. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1140 (Del.
Ch. 2011).
152. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 34, Globis Capital
Partners, LP v. Safenet, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2007) (C.A. No. 2772-VCS).
153. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch.
2008).
154. Id.
155. See generally, e.g., Globis Capital Partners, LP v. SafeNet, Inc.,
C.A. No. 2772-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *8 (Dec. 20, 2007).
156. Id.
157. See In re Lear Corp., 926 A.2d at 94; Globis Capital, 2007 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 237 at *1.
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plaintiff class.
Application of such principles can be seen in cases in both
pre- and post-Trulia periods. Fairness and balance between
give and get matter, but materiality does not appear in both
pre and post-Trulia periods. When the Court is not convinced
by the counsel’s effort that the claims have been vigorously
investigated, neither settlement nor fee award would be
approved. Wherever a settlement was approved and fee was
awarded, the fee award is entirely merit-based and fits in one
of the three scales discussed above.
In a 2013 case, then-Chancellor Strine declined to approve
a disclosure settlement in In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc.
Shareholders Litigation158 even when the traditional thing to
do would be to certify a class, approve the disclosure
settlement, and award an attorney fee.159 Strine admitted that
it was rare to place a duty on the court to “make sure that
The court is
classes are effectively represented . . . .”160
required “to act even in the absence of any kind of opposition to
Though Strine emphasized that the
a settlement.”161
additional information was not meaningful, not to mention
material, this was not the true reason he acted untraditionally.
It is the imbalance between the possibility of loss of a valuable
claim and the certainty that information that is of little utility
that warranted the rejection of the disclosure settlement. As
Strine stated, “I don’t have any confidence, unfortunately, that
there was a real plaintiff behind this monitoring counsel.”162
Strine suspects that a more diligent plaintiff might be able to
come forward with a damages action in the future. The
likelihood of this incident and, more importantly, the value of
this future option are more desirable to the Court than the
virtually valueless supplemental information.163 In serious
doubt of the equivalence or equality in the settlement, Strine
denied the settlement in the absence of any opposition and
158. In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS,
2013 WL 1191738, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id.
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decided to evaluate the merits of the case through an
adversarial process. The sua sponte rejection without an
objection was to ensure that the Court did not approve a class
action settlement that was clearly unfair.
In Riverbed,164 a case of similar facts decided in 2015, the
court approved the settlement despite the fact that the
disclosures cannot be found to be of any value except for small,
therapeutic value to the class. Vice Chancellor Glasscock
confirmed that this was the situation where, in Chancellor
Allen’s expression, “the plaintiffs have achieved for the Class a
peppercorn.”165 The court was the least bothered by the fact
that the benefit conferred by such settlement was
insubstantial. I think that what really concerned the court was
whether there was a disparity between what the plaintiffs give
up and what they receive. The Riverbed court sided with
Chancellor Allen in that a peppercorn is sufficient to support a
settlement so long as it is equal to the merits of the claims
given up.166 In this case, the court was convinced that what
was given up by the plaintiff was “basically nil” because, by the
plaintiff’s counsel’s own admission, they did not have a viable
claim under federal securities law.167 Again, value, benefits,
and materiality of the disclosure do not matter to the Delaware
Court of Chancery. The parity between the two sides of the
settlement does. It might appear that this decision was a clear
deviation from Transatlantic Holdings and Trulia, I, however,
see the consistencies. Here, even though the court was
convinced that the disclosure was valueless, so were the
plaintiff’s claims.
The court relied on the testimony of
plaintiff’s counsel about the viability of the claims in
determining that the give from the class was “basically nil.”168
The parity between the two sides of the settlement warranted
the approval. Still, given the merits of the disclosures, the
Court lowered the requested $500,000 fee to a fee that is within
164. In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG,
2015 WL 5458041, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).
165. Id. at *5.
166. Id. (“[A] positive result of small therapeutic value to the Class
which can support . . . a settlement, but only where what is given up is of
minimal value.”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Again, fairness matters,
the default range, $200,000.169
materiality of disclosures does not.
Interestingly, in a recent post-Trulia case in Delaware,
Vice Chancellor Glasscock, the Riverbed judge, reaffirmed the
materiality test in Trulia but awarded a fee for supplemental
disclosures that mooted four disclosure claims and ruled that
materiality was not required.170 He argued that materiality
does not apply to the award of attorney’s fees when there was
no settlement and a modest benefit of the supplemental
disclosure would support the award of attorney’s fees.171 The
plaintiffs sought $275,000 in attorney fees, the court awarded
only $50,000.172
2. Scope of the Release Proportionate to the Scope of the
Disclosures
The Chancery Court consistently refuses to approve
releases when the scope of the release is too broad compared to
the benefits conveyed by the disclosure.173 This practice works
to minimize global release and the loss of valuable claims.
Again, the success of such practice does not rely on having a
materiality requirement.
D. Gordon v. Verizon: The Best Interest of the Putative
Class is to Enforce the Bargain
New York courts did not follow Delaware in imposing a
materiality requirement. On the other hand, they enforce the
bargain when they are convinced that there was a presence of
bargaining in good faith.174 In this recent post-Trulia case,
169. Id. at *8.
170. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL
4146425, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del.
Ch. 2016); In re Medics Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, 2014 WL
1614336, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc.
S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL 1191738, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8,
2013).
174. See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557 (App. Div.
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Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,175 the court expressly
deviates from the tone set by Trulia. The New York Appellate
Court deliberately went for a different direction that favors the
non-monetary disclosure settlement when the merits of the
case warranted the disclosure settlement. The review of
settlement begins by examining “the likelihood of success, the
extent of support from the parties, the judgment of counsel, the
presence of bargaining in good faith, and the nature of the
issues of law and fact.”176 The New York Court also set a
different test for approving non-monetary settlement: whether
such settlement would be in the best interest of the members of
the putative class of shareholders and the corporation.177
The court agreed with plaintiff’s decision to withdraw their
claims for monetary damages “recognizing that they would be
difficult to prove at trial.”178 The court’s interest in assessing
the claims through adversarial process is conditioned upon the
availability of helpful additional disclosures. Here, the court
would approve the existing disclosure agreement because they
doubted the adversarial process would help plaintiff obtain
“any more helpful disclosures.”179 In addition, the New York
court understands that the best interest of the class is not
necessarily served by requiring either the monetary settlement
or the materiality of additional disclosure. According to the
Gordon court, the present proposed settlement, albeit
nonmonetary, does provide benefits to the plaintiff class with
its inclusion of a fairness opinion requirement in the event that
Verizon engages in a transaction with a book value in excess of
$14.4 billion, and corporate governance reforms.180 These
benefits warranted not only the approval of the settlement, but
also an award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff’s counsel.181
2017).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 566.
177. Id. at 568.
178. Id. at 567.
179. Id. (the court reasoned that “[i]t would be speculative, at best, to
assume that plaintiff could have obtained any more helpful disclosures from
Verizon by proceeding to trial.”).
180. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 569 (App. Div.
2017).
181. Id. (citing Seinfeld v. Robinson, 676 N.Y.S.2d 579 (App. Div. 1998)).
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The court expressly disavowed the Delaware requirement that
“additional information provided to shareholders in a
disclosure must contradict what has been previously disclosed
in order for the disclosure to be material is not supported by
New York law, however.”182
IV. Challenges to the Finality of Settlement: Ex-Post Remedies
to Overbroad Release
As I have argued earlier, the materiality requirement does
not ensure fairness and the doctrine of consideration dictates
that supplemental disclosure need not be adequate to be a
legally sufficient consideration.183 The combination of market
competition and judicial assessment works better to serve the
aim of achieving fairness in such class action settlements. As
to the overbroad release, the ex-ante scrutiny by the Court is
crucial but will never be able to prevent release of all
meritorious claims. Still, there is an ex-post remedy provided
by contract law if overall imbalance or gross disparity was
resulted from the settlement. Finality of settlement can be
challenged, enforcement of a release of liability can be
rescinded
when
it
was
induced
by
fraudulent
misrepresentation, and as being unconscionable when such a
release was overbroad compared to the benefit conveyed by
supplemental disclosure.
A. Fraud
A release can also be rescinded if it was induced by fraud.
In Matsuura v. Alston & Bird, the Ninth Circuit held that
releases signed in connection with settlement did not bar
action alleging fraudulent inducement of those releases.184 The
court announced that parties who have been fraudulently
induced to enter into a contract have a choice of remedies: they
may rescind the contract or they may affirm the contract and
182. Id. at 571.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
184. See generally 166 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/8

36

JIANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

5/9/18 12:31 AM

DISCLOSURE-ONLY SETTLEMENTS

605

sue for fraud.185 The court was of the opinion that “[e]nforcing
such a settlement would undermine the policy of encouraging
voluntary settlement of disputes: if litigants cannot assume the
disclosures and representations of the opposing party are made
in good faith, they will be reluctant to settle.”186
Following the teaching of Matsuura, the settlement could
be rescinded by the plaintiff class if there were any
misrepresentations made to induce a disclosure settlement that
secures broad release by giving out valueless additional
disclosure.
B. Overbroad as Unconscionable
Case law supports rescission based solely on overall
imbalance. In divorce settlements, an unfair settlement clause
would be deemed unconscionable. For example, in a New York
case, a settlement clause escalating lifetime (even if she
remarried) maintenance payments to the wife by four percent
every year was deemed unconscionable and set aside.187 The
court reasoned that it “represents a sum far in excess of the
value of plaintiff’s marital distribution.”188 In cases like this,
settlements can be set aside based simply on an unfair price.
In analogy, when disclosure was given in exchange for an
overbroad release compared to the benefits conveyed, when
reasonableness between give and get is missing and gross
disparity can be proved, the plaintiff class or the defendant
corporation would be able to rescind the settlement as
unconscionable.
In addition, even when one argues that procedural
unconscionability also has to be met before unconscionability
can be applied due to the huge disparity in sophistication and
resource between the stockholder class and the board of
directors, procedural unconscionability would not be difficult to
establish through the obvious unequal bargaining power
between the two.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1012.
Santini v. Robinson, 891 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 2009).
Id. at 104.
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V. Conclusion
The standard in approving class-action settlements has
always been fairness of the settlement. Due to the agency
problem and the conflicted interests between the plaintiff class
and the plaintiff’s counsel in the context of disclosure-only
settlements, the Delaware Court of Chancery established the
heightened materiality standard in approving such
settlements. Supposedly, such a solution shall curb the conflict
of interest and ensure fairness in disclosure-only settlements.
It is also supposed to prevent corporations from receiving courtapproved overbroad releases through non-material disclosures.
However, a settlement is a contract. As I have established,
contract law preserves fairness by enforcing the bargain as it
is. The materiality requirement, on the other hand, will
contradict the very notion that enforcement of pre-existing
legal duty is no consideration. Also, it will not serve the public
policy of ensuring fairness in disclosure-only settlements. It
also creates the ethical dilemma that would encourage
corporations to withhold material information. As I have
proved, market mechanisms function to eventually weed out
plaintiff firms that bring weak claims and have no interest in
adequately representing a plaintiff class. Chancellors have
used their discretionary power to reject settlements and fee
awards when it is clear that there was no adequate
representation.
Judicial assessment of the Court in
determining the fee award realigns the incentives and interest
between the plaintiff class and the plaintiff’s counsel by
quantifying attorney’s fees according to a meticulous threescale system.
Moreover, finality of settlement can be challenged and
overbroad release can still be rescinded by applying two
contract law doctrines: fraudulent misrepresentation and
unconscionability.
Lastly, I predict the materiality standard will not sit well
with the approval of disclosure-only settlements. In enforcing
a contract, all that a court ought to do is to enforce the bargain
and make sure the bargaining process was in good faith and
conducted fairly. Market competition will ensure the fairness
of the price, as the price would naturally be the fair market
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price. When market is not competitive, exploitation will take
place. When there is a lie, fraudulent inducement would be
sufficient to rescind a contract.
When there is no lie,
unconscionability works to restore the fairness. Disclosure
settlements can be valuable to the stockholder class and shall
continue its function in shareholder litigation. The future of
approving disclosure-only settlements lies in the combination
of judicial enforcement of the bargain and meticulous judicial
assessment of attorney’s fees.
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